Shedding light on the shadows of informality : A meta-analysis of formalization interventions targeted at informal firms by Floridi, A. (Andrea) et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
No. 642 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrea Floridi, Binyam Afewerk Demena, and Natascha Wagner 
 
 
 
 
February 2019 
Shedding light on the shadows of informality:  
A meta-analysis of formalization interventions targeted 
at informal firms 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
 
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl/en/library 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 
The Netherlands  
or  
E-mail: wpapers@iss.nl 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  4 
1 INTRODUCTION 5 
2   LITERATURE REVIEW 8 
2.1 Informal firms: four competing models 8 
2.2 Empirical literature about the impact of formalization policies 9 
3   METHODOLOGY 12 
3.1 The meta-dataset 13 
3.2 Empirical approach 15 
4  MAIN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 18 
4.1 Genuine effect and publication bias 18 
4.2 Accounting for heterogeneity across studies: multivariate  
analysis 21 
4.3 Further analyses and robustness checks 24 
5 CONCLUSIONS 28 
REFERENCES  29 
APPENDICES  29 
Appendix 1: Studies included in the meta-analysis 33 
Appendix 2: Additional robustness checks excluding working papers 34 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
Governments and policy-makers promote formalization through various 
interventions ranging from simplifying registration procedures to increasing 
enforcement of the law. But despite various efforts, not much is known about 
the effects of interventions aiming at formalizing informal firms. This meta-
analysis examines the empirical literature on the impact of such formalization 
interventions. We systematically assessed the literature on the impact of 
formalization policies resulting in 568 observations from 18 studies conducted 
by 33 researchers and published until June 2018. We analyzed the meta-impact 
of (i) cost, (ii) benefit and (iii) enforcement policy interventions and assessed 
whether the resulting outcomes are influenced by the type of data, econometric 
approach, and specification as well as publication bias. The findings suggest 
that policies increasing the benefits after formalization are associated with the 
highest formalization rates. Yet, the overall impact of the studied policy 
interventions remains weak when we control for publication quality and 
method heterogeneity. Overall, we only find modest evidence for increased 
formalization associated with the so far implemented interventions suggesting 
that it is high time to consider new approaches in addressing the informal 
economy. 
Keywords 
Meta-regression analysis, informal enterprises, formalization, developing 
countries. 
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Shedding light on the shadows of informality 1 
A meta-analysis of formalization interventions targeted at 
informal firms 
1 Introduction 
Since the first definition in 1973, the concepts of informal sector and informal 
economy have been a research concern in labor economics (Hart, 1973). 
However, only in the late 1980’s these concepts took central stage in the 
debate around policy-making. The renewed attention to the informal economy 
led policymakers to implement policies that aim at tackling the two main 
components of the informal economy, i.e. informal employment and informal 
firms. Governments and policy-makers started including the informal economy 
in their agenda culminating in the explicit inclusion of informal economy and 
work as part of the Sustainable Development Goals. To date, there is a large 
variety of policies and interventions targeting the informal economy. The most 
common approach in policymaking is formalization (Williams and Round 
2007). But policies range from improving access to credit to providing training 
and other business development services to informal business. Other 
interventions aim at strengthening the linkages between informal and formal 
economy.  
Formalization is considered to have a positive effect on economic growth, 
employment creation, labor productivity, labor conditions, and social 
protection (International Labour Organization, 2015; Fajnzylber et al., 2011; 
Tijdens et al., 2015; Gatti et al., 2014). In contrast, informal economy is 
associated with low quality institutions (Loyaza et al. 2005). Informal 
enterprises are perceived as deleterious for the economy since they often 
underreport employment, avoid taxes, threaten formal firms by cutting costs of 
regulation and infringing copyrights (Schneider et al., 2011; USAID, 2005; 
Farrell 2004, 2008; Baily et al., 2006). Consequently, formalizing informal firms 
is considered as a strategic step necessary to unlock the potential economic 
growth, increasing competitiveness, jobs and government revenues from 
taxation.  
Governments and policy-makers promote formalization through various 
interventions ranging from simplifying registration procedures to increasing 
enforcement of the law. The various types of interventions can be categorized 
into three main policy approaches: (i) cutting costs and simplifying procedures, 
(ii) increasing benefits, and (iii) increasing the level of enforcement and visits 
by officers. In addition, some interventions are accompanied by information 
and awareness campaigns. 
                                                 
1 We thank Tom Stanley, Hristos Doucouliagos and the participants of the 2018 Meta-
Analysis in Economic Research Network (MAER-Net) conference in Melbourne 
(Australia) for their insightful comments and discussions. 
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Notwithstanding the manifold efforts by policymakers to formalize the 
informal economy, there is still a knowledge gap concerning systematic 
evidence about the effects of interventions aiming at formalization. Little is 
known concerning firm responses to formalization policies and interventions 
and the literature presents contrasting evidence about their success. While 
meta-regression analysis (MRA) have been applied in various fields in 
economics, for instance in labor economics (Card and Krueger, 1995; 
Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009; Grimm and Paffhausen; 2015), international 
economics (Iršová and Havránek, 2013; Demena, 2015; Demena and Bergeijk, 
2017) and development economics (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2015; 
Havránek et al., 2016), we are not aware of any meta-analysis covering the 
outcomes of private sector policies on the formalization of firms. There are 
two reviews focusing on policies that promote formalization (Bruhn and Mc 
Kenzie, 2014; Grimm and Paffhausen, 2015). Bruhn and McKenzie (2014) 
reviewed evidence about the effect of entry reforms on firms’ formalization 
selecting nine primary studies without imposing a systematic literature search 
and not carrying out a meta-analysis. The authors showed that based on their 
selection of studies there is only a modest increase in formalization. They 
suggest that increased enforcement efforts could result in higher formalization 
rates and that there might be a fiscal benefit to formalizing large informal 
firms. The second study provides a systematic review that analyses the 
outcomes of private sector interventions on employment generation without 
an exclusive focus on informality (Grimm and Paffhausen, 2015); the part of 
the review that zooms in on informality includes five studies about 
interventions that promote employment formalization. Our focus is not on 
employment generation as in the study by Grimm and Paffhausen (2015) but 
on formalization policies as in Bruhn and McKenzie (2014). Compared to 
Bruhn and McKenzie (2014), the paper at hand expands in terms of scope and 
rigor of the analysis. We systematically gathered all relevant, accessible studies 
adding the most recent primary studies to the analysis. Moreover, we use meta-
regression analysis techniques to give a quantitative appraisal of the effects of 
policies promoting formalization. Importantly, we exploit the heterogeneity of 
the existing primary studies to assess the extent to which the impact of a 
considered formalization policy varies depending on the chosen formality 
indicator, the estimation method adopted, the characteristics of the population 
benefitting from the intervention, and other potential sources of bias. We use 
meta-regression analysis to synthesize the existing evidence of reported 
empirical findings for a similar empirical effect, program interventions, and/or 
phenomenon (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). Unlike the existing qualitative 
reviews, our meta-analysis enables us to estimate the underlying impact of 
interventions on formalization after quantitatively accounting for study 
heterogeneities and potential publication bias. With the meta-regression 
analysis we can rigorously disentangle the factors driving the reported impacts. 
To that end, we include all accessible studies published until June 2018. Our 
analysis rests on 568 observations from 18 econometric studies contributed by 
33 researchers dealing with eight developing countries.  
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We jointly meta-analyze the impact of (i) costs reducing, (ii) benefit 
increasing, and (iii) enforcement increasing interventions that promote the 
formalization of informal firms. We consider it high time to produce 
systematic evidence across interventions to guide policy makers towards the 
most effective policies. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the 
first meta-analysis synthesizing all existing quantitative evidence on 
formalization policies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a 
review of the literature. Section 3 explains the data and empirical approach. 
The main findings from the meta-analysis are presented in section 4 and 
section 5 concludes. 
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2   Literature review 
The process of formalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that aims at the 
two main components of the informal economy, namely informal firms and 
informal employment. The two processes of formalization of informal 
employment and firms are driven by different factors and therefore deserve to 
be explored separately. This study focuses on the formalization of informal 
enterprises. When considering the decision of formalizing a business, we can 
distinguish at least two crucial moments, the start-up phase of an enterprise 
and already operating informal firms. We focus on the formalization of the 
latter. Before, starting with the meta-analysis we briefly discuss the theoretical 
conceptualization of informal firms since it motivates the different policy 
interventions.  
2.1 Informal firms: four competing models 
Four main models dominate the theoretical literature concerning the decision 
of formalizing a business: (i) exclusion model (De Soto, 1990, 2003), (ii) 
rational exit model (Maloney, 2004), (iii) parasite model (Farrell, 2004, 2006, 
Baily et al., 2006), and (iv) dual economy model (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, 
2014). 
The exclusion model argues that high costs of registration and long 
bureaucratic procedures prevent the participation of some firms in the formal 
economy (De Soto, 1990, 2003). Informal enterprises are excluded from 
engaging with the formal economy since they cannot afford formalization. The 
obvious resulting policy for promoting firm formalization is a decrease in the 
costs of formality. The exclusion model had great impact on policymakers 
including the World Bank; the World Bank promoted regulatory reforms 
aiming at decreasing direct costs and the time of formally starting-up a business 
(Bruhn and Mc Kenzie, 2013; Campos et al., 2015; 2018; De Andrade et al., 
2013; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). The World Bank’s ‘Doing Business Project’ 
recorded reforms of business regulation implemented by 190 countries 
between 2006 and 2018. Out of the 2,783 reforms recorded in September 
2018, 556 (20%) consist of simplifying registration procedures by cutting direct 
and indirect (time) costs. One-Stop Shop (OSS) programs are a resulting 
strategy for promoting firm formalization endorsed by World Bank (Campos 
et al., 2018). 
The implementation of OSS programs has been successful in decreasing 
the costs of formalization; nonetheless they had limited effects on informal 
firms (Bruhn and Mc Kenzie, 2013; Campos et al., 2015; 2018; De Andrade et 
al., 2013). In some case, those policies increased the number of firms 
registering their business. Yet, this increase was mainly explained by the 
creation of new formal enterprises rather than by previously informal firms 
switching to formality (Bruhn, 2011; Klapper et al., 2006; La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2008; Parga and Mondragón-Vélez, 2008). 
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In contrast to the exclusion model, which associates formality mainly with 
excessive costs, the rational exit model incorporates both the costs and 
benefits of formalizing a business (Maloney 2004; Perry 2007). This model 
argues that entrepreneurs undertake a cost-benefit analysis about the decision 
to formalize. Firms operate formally when the benefits of formalizing 
outweigh the costs. Policies should therefore aim at concurrently decreasing 
costs and increasing benefits of registration; possible actions range from tax 
exemptions for newly registered firms, to credit facilitation and business 
development services. 
In a completely different spirit, the parasite model argues that informal 
enterprises have a deleterious effect on economic growth since they decrease 
revenues by avoiding taxes and they unfairly compete with formal firms by 
saving on the costs of legalization. The parasite model ascribes the decision of 
(not) formalizing the business to the quality of the regulatory framework: 
enterprises operate informally due to the low level of enforcement and the 
costs of formalization (Farrell 2004, 2006; Baily et al., 2006). The main factors 
affecting formalization are the level of enforcement both actual and perceived. 
Interventions that are motivated by the parasite model increase the level of 
enforcement (Farrell, 2004). Policy-makers can take actions that range from 
awareness campaigns about the legal risks of operating informally to a higher 
frequency of official visits and screenings. 
Finally, the dual economy model argues that informal and formal 
enterprises operate in two distinct spheres with informal activities not 
damaging formal ones (La Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2014). The model depicts 
informal activities as exhibiting different characteristics: informal firms are 
small, unproductive, run by low educated entrepreneurs, use capital and in 
particular external finance to a limited extent, and have different customers. 
The dual economy framework argues that the majority of the informal firms 
carry out unproductive survival activities that are likely to be crowded out 
following a Walmart theory of economic development that suggests growth is 
driven by highly productive firms and leading informal enterprises to die out 
(La Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2014). Informal enterprises are not responsive to 
formalization policies; therefore, promoters of the dual economy model 
suggest focusing on formal enterprises and not taking any particular action 
addressed to informal firms although they acknowledge that regulatory reforms 
might help those informal entrepreneurs who want to register their business. 
 
2.2 Empirical literature about the impact of formalization 
policies 
Following the theoretical debate on informal firms’ formalization, in recent 
years researchers undertook great efforts to collect evidence about which 
theory best explains entrepreneurial choices regarding business registration. 
Existing quantitative evidence derives from impact evaluations of policy 
reforms and pilot experiments reporting positive as well as negative findings 
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depending on the design of the intervention and the implemented study design 
(Bruhn and McKenzie 2014).  
Most micro-level studies analyze the effects of regulatory reforms cutting 
monetary costs and time costs (Bruhn 2011, 2013; Rothenberg 2016). The 
majority of the studies finds fairly small positive impacts on firm registration; 
only in a few cases the reduction in costs led to a significant increase in the 
number of businesses formalizing. The limited impact of cost reduction 
interventions challenges the exclusion model that argues that costs reductions 
stimulate business registration. 
In an attempt to explore the rational exit model, other studies investigated 
the effects of increasing benefits on business registration. For instance, the 
impact of monetary incentives on the decision to formalize has been addressed 
(De Mel 2013; Jaramillo 2013; Fandl 2016). De Mel (2013) conducted an 
experiment in Sri Lanka offering monetary incentives for registration and 
found a large positive impact. Yet, other authors reported no significant 
change in firm registration after offering various monetary incentives (Jaramillo 
2013; Fandl 2016). 
Another group of studies investigated the parasite model by conducting 
field experiments with enforcement activities (De Giorgi et al. 2015, 2018; 
Galiani et al., 2017). De Giorgi et al. (2018) conducted an experiment in 
Bangladesh, where firms receive a visit by a tax officer, and found a small 
increase in registration. Galiani et al. (2017) employed an experimental design 
to assess the impact of meetings with officers from the chamber of commerce 
on business licensing. The positive impact of the meetings lasted only for one 
year as many firms failed to renew their license. 
Lastly, several experimental studies compared competing models of 
formalization (De Andrade et al., 2014; De Giorgi et al., 2013; Galiani et al., 
2017). De Andrade et al. (2014) reports that increasing enforcement is more 
effective compared to increasing the benefits of formalization. In similar vein, 
De Giorgi et al. (2013) show that firms are more likely to register if they 
receive information about procedures and benefits compared to firms that do 
not receive that information. Galiani et al. (2017) provides evidence that firms 
visited by officers are more likely to register compared to firms that receive 
information at a workshop about the costs and benefit of formalization. 
Overall, the micro-economic evidence shows contrasting outcomes for 
similar actions that took place in different countries. In some case, scholars 
report different results even for the same reform; for instance, Piza (2016) 
demonstrated that the impact of the SIMPLES program in Brazil changed 
depending on whether the cutoff date in the analysis is November (Fajnzylber 
et al. 2011) or December (Monteiro and Assunção 2012). 
A source of variation that is likely to contribute to the contrasting findings 
is the unobserved heterogeneity of informal firms (Berner et al. 2012; Floridi et 
al., 2016; Grimm et al., 2012; Williams and Round, 2007; Williams and Sahid, 
2016). Berner et al. (2012) identify the existence of two types of informal 
activities: survival activities in the lower tier, and growth oriented activities in 
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the upper tier. Grimm and Knorringa (2012) add a third category represented 
by informal operate on small scale to avoid larger competitors and government 
taxes. Floridi et al. (2016) and Williams and Said (2016) focus on the existence 
of hybrid forms of entrepreneurs consisting of firms neither wholly formal nor 
wholly informal. The heterogeneity of informal firms cannot be neglected 
when designing formalization policies; there might be covert characteristics 
that affect the decision of registering a business. Indeed, some firms could be 
too small for bearing the costs of formalization or for benefiting from 
formalization. The few studies in the empirical literature that address the 
problem of endogeneity show that formalization results might be driven by 
individual firms’ characteristics. Bruhn (2013) combines individual 
entrepreneurs and business characteristics for identifying two different species 
of entrepreneurs showing that they are not equally responsive to a regulatory 
reform cutting the costs and time of licensing. In similar spirit, Monteiro and 
Assunçao (2012) and Fajnzylber et al. (2011) show that simplifying procedures 
for registering a business in Brazil had higher impacts on retailing firms 
compared to firms operating in other sectors. 
Evidence gathered at the macro-level suggests that the informal economy 
persists over time and are associated with government regulations, the tax 
burden, and quality of the institutions (ILO 2002, 2013; Schneider 2000, 2011; 
Charmes 2010; Loyaza 2005). The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
conducted a study showing that the size of the informal economy has increased 
worldwide in the two decades between 1980 and 2000 (ILO 2002). Recently, 
ILO published updated statistics recording a positive trend in informality for 
the period 2000 to 2010 as well (ILO 2013). Similarly, Charmes (2012) 
estimated global trends of the informal economy for the period 1980 to 2009 
and found that the informal economy has constantly grown worldwide in 
terms of employment generation and contribution to GDP. Likewise, 
Schneider (2000) estimated that the informal economy has reached a 
considerable size globally and that the main determinants of the size of the 
informal economy are heavy tax burdens and social security provisions 
combined with government regulations. In contrast, Schneider (2011) 
estimated trends for 162 countries for the years 1999 to 2007 and found a 
negative trend. Loyaza (2005) conducted a cross-country analysis to explore the 
relation between the institutional framework and the size of the informal 
economy and found a positive relation between the size of the informal 
economy and corruption, and a negative relation with the quality of 
institutions.  
Since the existing studies present a large variety of approaches and results, 
we consider it high time to systematically consolidate and assess the overall 
impact of the different policies. 
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3   Methodology 
We collected the relevant documents from the literature following the 
population-intervention-comparison-outcome-population (PICOC) protocol 
advocated for by Petticrew and Roberts (2008); concerning the meta-analysis 
we applied the meta-analysis guidelines by Stanley et al. (2013). The PICOC 
protocol was adopted as it fits well for policy-oriented systematic reviews. Our 
population consists of informal firms; the considered interventions are various 
policies to stimulate the formalization of informal firms; comparisons between a 
treatment and a control group can be made and the considered outcomes range 
from registration, to license, and tax number; the context is worldwide, although 
we found only documents from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. To cover the 
existing literature as exhaustively as possible, we adopted several queries and 
alternative strategies for retrieving relevant documents. We started with an 
internet search using queries that consisted of the following keywords or 
combinations thereof: “formalization, registration, reform, or policy; informal 
or unregistered; and firms or enterprises”. As further search strategy we used 
synonyms of the terms adopted in the queries. Since these simple queries 
resulted in a large amount of possible hits, we employed allintext and allintitle 
before the query to limit the research to those documents using the exact 
words of the query in the text (allintext) or in the title (allintitle); for instance: 
“allintext: formalization firms”. We included studies published until June 2018.  
Selection of documents and coding have been conducted by two 
researchers independently to reduce bias due to human error. We searched 
potential studies using three main databases: Google Scholar, Scopus, and the 
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository. The collection of the documents 
followed two stages: internet search and hand searching. Hand searching was 
added to the internet search to include references that were found in the 
documents selected in the first stage.  
We found 114 articles that seemed to satisfy our criteria. Among the 114 
documents initially identified, none of them dates before 1992, 71% (81) came 
out after 2010. Hence, the empirical literature on firm formalization has a 
relatively recent history compared to the broader literature on the informal 
economy. This is not surprising since dualist models dominated the first two 
decades of the debate and they assumed that the informal economy was likely 
to disappear over time; only after the realization that the dualist view was not 
properly capturing the phenomenon of informality, increased attention was 
paid to formalization processes. 
After having collected the potential primary studies, the review proceeded 
with the selection of articles satisfying the inclusion criteria. First, we searched 
for relevant information contained in the introduction and conclusions of the 
identified potential studies. We identified 80 articles satisfying the eligibility 
criteria, and 34 ineligible articles. Next, we inspected the 80 potential studies 
concerning their data, considered outcomes, and methods adopted leading to  
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the identification of 22 studies. The main reason for excluding articles is that 
the documents do not provide quantitative evidence. Moreover, other studies 
have been excluded because they analyze outcomes different from 
formalization of enterprises such as employment creation and profitability. 
Two of the 22 identified studies only contained descriptive statistics that are 
not suitable for the meta-analysis. Another two studies were dropped since 
they were unpublished or previous versions of already selected articles were the 
reported coefficients are identical. Following the established standards in meta-
analysis we kept those working paper versions along with the published papers 
that report different coefficient estimates in moving from one version to the 
next (Polanin and Pigott, 2015; Polanin et al., 2016). We gauge the sensitivity 
of our results to this approach. 
3.1 The meta-dataset 
As discussed, the heterogeneity in formalization policies and evaluation designs 
is considerable and therefore it is not a straightforward task to construct the 
dataset for the meta-analysis. We took the following approach: Concerning 
study design, the selected articles adopted two types of evaluation approaches: 
randomized experimental approach, and non-experimental impact assessment. 
Furthermore, we clustered the interventions into three types of policies, i.e. (i) 
cost reducing, (ii) benefit enhancing, (iii) enforcement. With each type of policy 
we can test the empirical validity of a competing theoretical model (compare 
section 2.1).  
The identified primary studies can be summarized mathematically in the 
following baseline model:  
                  (1) 
where i denotes firm, Y the formalization outcome, and T1, T2 and T3 are 
indicators for being assigned to policy 1, 2 or 3, respectively. X represents a 
vector of control variables and  is the remaining error term. 
The heterogeneity of the identified studies is also reflected in the outcome 
variable used to proxy for formalization. Most articles adopt either registration 
or licensing, while a few papers use tax registration, tax payment or provision 
of social security. We clustered indicators in three groups corresponding to 
registration, licenses, and other indicators. The main difference between 
registration and license is that the latter is only temporary and needs to be 
periodically renewed; thus, we can interpret licenses as indicator for the short-
term decision to formalize, whereas registration can be understood as a proxy 
for the decision to formalize in the medium to long run. In this respect it is 
important to recognize that the proxy adopted for assessing formalization 
depends on the legal framework at the national and local level as based on the 
local context some activities do not require any license next to registration.  
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Next, we did not only extract data on outcome characteristics but also on 
sample and data features, estimation techniques, the employed specification, 
and publication characteristics (Table 1). Data characteristics include the 
number of survey rounds, the number of observations, firm type as defined by  
Table 1 
Definition and descriptive statistics of collected variables 
Moderator Variables Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
 Outcome Characteristics   
E Formalization effect size 0.01 0.63 
SE Standard error of effect size 0.08 0.41 
TSTAT Estimated t-stat of effect size 1.92 4.91 
PCC Partial correlation coefficient 0.04 0.09 
PCCSE Standard error of PCC 0.02 0.01 
DF Logarithm of number of degrees of freedom 8.27 1.66 
No. Exp. Number of explanatory variables included 16.92 13.73 
Data Characteristics                                 
No. Time Logarithm of the number of survey rounds 1.41 0.30 
No. Obs. Logarithm of number of observations 8.28 1.66 
Micro firm =1 if data come from micro firms  0.41 0.49 
Small firm =1 if data come from small firms 0.36 0.48 
MSME =1 if data used any micro, small or medium firms 0.24 0.42 
Latin America =1 if data come from Latin America  0.51 0.50 
Africa =1 if data come from Africa 0.31 0.46 
Asia =1 if data come from Asia 0.18 0.38 
Estimation Characteristics    
OLS =1 if estimation method is OLS  0.55 0.50 
Year FE =1 if year fixed effects are included  0.17 0.38 
Sector FE =1 if sector fixed effects are included 0.21 0.41 
Market =1 if market or location fixed effects are included 0.84 0.37 
Econometric Approach =1 if randomized experimental design 0.62 0.49 
Intervention Policy 
Cost =1 if intervention is reducing cost and time 0.77 0.42 
Benefit =1 if intervention is providing benefit 0.18 0.39 
Enforcement =1 if intervention is threat of punishment  0.14 0.35 
Information =1 if information is provided 0.47 0.50 
Specification Characteristics   
Formal =1 if dependent variable is measured as formalized   0.92 0.28 
Registration =1 if formalization indicator is registration   0.43 0.50 
License  =1 if formalization indicator is license   0.37 0.48 
Other =1 if formalization indicator is other    0.21 0.40 
Gender =1 if gender of the business owner is included  0.28 0.45 
Age =1 if age of the business owner is included 0.24 0.42 
Education =1 if education of the business owner is included 0.26 0.44 
Household =1 if specification controls for household size  0.14 0.34 
Interaction terms =1 if coefficient comes from interaction variables 0.19 0.40 
Publication Characteristics  
Publication year Logarithm of the publication year of the study 
(base, 2008) 
1.98 0.40 
Published =1 if published in a peer-reviewed journal 0.48 0.50 
Study citations Logarithm of citations in Google Scholar per age of 
the study, as of June 2018 
1.41 1.07 
Journal impact Recursive journal impact factor from RePEc 0.41 0.46 
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the World Bank (micro, small, or medium firms), geographical region (we 
found studies from Latin America, Asia, and Africa). Next, we included 
information concerning the estimation techniques. We found four types of 
empirical models: (i) plain vanilla ordinary least square (OLS), (ii) models with 
year fixed-effects, (iii) models with sector fixed effects, and (iv) models with 
market fixed effects. We also have information about the study type, i.e. 
whether the study used a randomized controlled design. As specification 
features we have an indicator for registration (registration, license, others), 
whether the regression controls for gender, age, education, and size of the 
household of the business owner. In addition, we have an indicator for the 
presence of interaction terms. The publication characteristics include the year 
of publication, publication status (published vs. unpublished), number of 
citations, and journal impact factors. 
Almost half the estimates employ registration as indicator of formality. 
Concerning the assessed policy type, the majority of the estimates comes from 
studies assessing the impact of policies cutting the costs and time needed for 
registration (77 %). Most studies assess micro (up to five employees) and small 
(between five and 20 employees) firms, while about a quarter of the studies 
includes all types of MSMEs. More than half of the total observations in our 
dataset come from studies conducted in Latin American countries, followed by 
Africa, and Asia. The great majority of the estimates stems from regressions 
that include market fixed effect.  
3.2 Empirical approach 
The empirical approach we employed is based on the existing MAER-Net 
guidelines provided by Stanley et al. (2013). The assessment follows three 
stages: First, we present the overall average effects without accounting for 
publication bias and the nature of heterogeneity in the reported estimates. In 
line with seminal contributions in meta-regression analysis (Doucouliagos, 
2005; Havránek et al., 2016), we compute the partial correlation coefficient 
(PCC) to make the reported estimates comparable across the studies. We 
derive the PCC as: 
 (2) 
where  denotes the partial correlation coefficient between a 
policy/regulatory change and formalization. We measure the association in 
terms of direction and strength of these two variables holding other variable 
constant; r and s denote the reported regression specification and the primary 
study, respectively;  represents the reported estimate’s t-value and df are the 
associated degrees of freedom for each regression specification used in the 
primary study. Using the PCC, an arithmetic mean is computed with the invers 
of the variance and the number of reported estimates per study as weights. 
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In the second step, we use both visual and statistical analyses to investigate 
the possibility of publication bias and the so-called, overall genuine empirical 
effect. We employ the Funnel-Asymmetry Test (FAT) and the Precision-Effect 
Testing (PET) for performing the meta-regression analysis. We start with the 
funnel plot, a scatter diagram showing the estimated effects on the horizontal 
axis and their precision on the vertical axis. Precision is usually indicated by the 
reciprocal of the standard error (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010 and 2012; 
Iršová and Havránek, 2013; Demena, 2017). This graphical analysis of 
publication bias is subjective as it depends on visual inspection. In addition, we 
use a formal statistical approach derived by Card and Krueger (1995) and 
Stanley (2005). The test assesses whether the estimated effects are randomly 
distributed across the primary studies. Formally, we estimate:         
                                                     (3) 
where  is the measure of formalization efforts computed for the rth 
regression specification and the sth study,  denotes its standard error,  
the overall genuine effect and  publication bias. The underlying intuition of 
Eq. (3) is that as the sample size increases and thus the quantity of available 
information increases, will approach zero (Stanley 2005). According to 
Roberts and Stanley (2005) this implies that for estimates derived from larger 
sample sizes, will approach , i.e., the underlying overall formalization 
efforts accounting for publication bias. Consequently, in the absence of 
publication bias the overall effect should vary randomly around  irrespective 
of  (Card and Krueger, 1995; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009; Stanley 
and Doucouliagos, 2010).  
Note that Eq. (3) is likely to be measured with heteroscedasticity and 
within-study dependence. To reduce the first problem weights are employed. 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) suggest as weighting scheme the inverse of 
the variance of the estimated  and thus Eq. (3) can be expressed as 
weighted least squares (WLS) model: 
}                                                           (4)
where  is the t-statistic of the PCC derived from .  
To address the second challenge associated with Eq. (3), i.e. the within-
study correlation, we employ the approach chosen by the majority of the meta-
analysts and apply study-level clustered standard errors.  
As third step, after having detected potential biases and heterogeneity, we 
explore the underlying sources of heterogeneity to explain the potential reasons 
behind the divergent results in the reported estimates. In other words, Eq. (4) 
measures the average effect across the various econometric designs and 
publication characteristics. In the final model we include potential moderator 
variables as discussed in section 2 and listed in Table 1:  
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                               (5)
where X represents the matrix of moderator variables with the inverse of the 
variances as weights,  is the vector of the associated coefficients and k refers 
to the specific category of the moderator variable.  
To gauge the robustness of our findings, we employ three models: (i) the 
ordinary least squares (OLS), (ii) the mixed-effects multilevel (MEM) and (iii) 
the fixed effects (FE) model. But we have a clear preference for the MEM 
approach as it accounts for both the between and within-study dependence 
(Bateman and Jones, 2003; Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009).  The relevance 
of accounting for between-study dependence via the MEM model is widely 
documented in recent meta-analyses in economics (Demena, 2015; Havránek 
et al., 2016; Demena and Bergeijk, 2017). In additional robustness checks, we 
use an alternative weighting approach employing the number of reported 
estimates per study in order to give each study the same weight.  
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4  Main findings and discussion 
4.1 Genuine effect and publication bias 
The first and most striking result of the meta-analysis is that the considered 
interventions had a limited impact on the formalization of informal firms. This 
finding is in line with Bruhn and McKenzie (2014). Table 2 presents summary 
statistics of the overall impact of the various reforms and actions taken 
together. The simple average effect of the formalization efforts is 0.038 with a 
95% confidence interval of [0.031–0.045]. This implies a positive and 
statistically significant impact, while at the same time indicates limited practical 
significance. Applying the meta-analysis guidelines by Doucouliagos (2011), a 
meta-regression coefficient is small if it is at most 0.07, it is of medium size if it 
ranges around 0.17, and large if it is at least 0.33. The summary statistics using 
inverse variance and frequency weights, suggest a similar picture.  
Table 2 
Estimates of the overall entry reforms and related policy actions (PCC) 
Method Effect size S.E 95% confidence interval 
Simple average effecta 0.038 0.004 0.031 0.045 
Weighted average effectb 0.002 0.001 0.0004 0.004 
Weighted average effectc  0.025 0.003 0.019 0.032 
Note:  aarithmetic mean of the PCC. binverse variance as weight; cweighted by the inverse of the   
number of estimates reported per study.  
 
Thus, at first glance, the data seem to suggest that the dual economy 
model best explains the decision of non-formalizing the business, since the 
model argues that informal firms are not responsive to regulatory reforms. 
However, this simple meta-coefficient has not yet taken into account 
publication bias and other source of bias. 
Next we investigate whether the limited impact is affected by publication 
bias. We start with the visual approach making use of a funnel plot. In the 
absence of publication bias, the plot should be symmetrical; an asymmetrical 
plot suggests publication bias. We use the PCC on the horizontal axis, and the 
logarithm of the precision of the effect size on the vertical axis (Figure 1). The 
plot is slightly skewed to the bottom right of the diagram suggesting the 
presence of an upward bias that is in line with the small positive impact 
reported in Table 2. 
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Figure 1 
Funnel plot of entry reforms and related policy actions (N=568) 
 
Note: For an improved visualization of the funnel plot, the logarithm  
of the reciprocal of the SE of the PCC is denoted at the vertical  
axis.    
As elaborated, the visual representation of the publication bias might be 
misleading. We therefore perform FAT and PET analyses. Table 3 presents 
results from the FAT-PET bivariate analysis. Across econometric methods, we 
consistently find upward bias as indicated by the positive and highly statistically 
significant coefficient estimates that range between 1.556 and 2.095. The PET 
test suggests a small negative and significant effect in the clustered data analysis 
(CDA) model, which is not identified with the other two models. Thus, the 
FAT test provides unanimous and the PET tests supportive evidence for the 
presence of a weak impact of the studied formalization interventions. As 
evident from the Q-test and the I2 test reported in the note to Table 3, 
however, we need a multivariate MRA that controls for other sources of 
heterogeneity in the reported estimates (compare Section 3.1).     
Table 3 
Bivariate Meta-Regression Analysis for the FAT-PET 
All studies 
 CDA MEM FE 
Variables Coefficient       t-value  Coefficient         t-value Coefficient        t-value 
Bias (FAT) 2.095***        3.12 1.556**             2.88 1.967***          21.36 
Genuine effect (PET) -0.002**       -2.29 -0.001             -0.69 -0.001             -0.55 
Observations 568 568 568 
Studies 18 18 18 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. CDA - clustered data analysis with study level 
clustered standard errors; MEM - mixed-effects multilevel estimates derived from restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation; FE - fixed-effects estimation at the study level. The test for between-study 
heterogeneity (Q-test) is 15587.94*** on 567 degrees of freedom with a p-value of less than 0.001 and the 
I2 statistic (variation in reported estimates attributable to heterogeneity) is 96.4%. All estimates use the 
inverse variance as weights and standard errors are clustered at study level. Reported t-values are from 
cluster-robust standard errors.  
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Yet, before we move to the multivariate analysis, an important concern is 
whether the above results are subject to the number of primary studies 
included in the analysis. Therefore, we analyze whether our results are sensitive 
to the inclusion or exclusion of any specific, single study. We conduct a Jack-
knife experiment re-running the same regressions as for the above FAT and 
PET tests but excluding one study at a time. To better visualize the reported 
estimates, we report only results using the CDA and MEM model. Results of 
the FE are available upon request, but are virtually similar. Table 4 presents the 
results. The two test results emulate our main findings presented in Table 3. 
The results are not only comparable and stable in terms of statistical 
significance, but also in magnitude and direction of the coefficients. This 
demonstrates that our results are not driven by the influence of any single 
study. 
Table 4 
Bivariate Meta-Regression Analysis for the FAT-PET: Jack-knife experiment 
Dropped individual 
studies 
Dropped 
observations 
CDA MEM Total 
observations 
  FAT 
coefficient 
PET 
coefficient 
FAT 
coefficient 
PET 
coefficient 
 
Benhassine et al. (2015) 60 1.734** -0.001* 1.310** -0.001 508 
Benhassine et al. (2018) 63 1.842** -0.001* 1.369** -0.001 505 
Bruhn (2008) 11 2.116** -0.002* 1.556** -0.001 557 
Bruhn (2011) 9 2.118** -0.002* 1.568** -0.001 559 
Bruhn (2013) 8 2.109** -0.002** 1.604** -0.001 560 
Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2013) 
32 2.363*** -0.002** 1.886*** -0.001 536 
Campos et al. (2015) 54 1.671** -0.001* 1.216** -0.001 514 
de Andrade et al. (2014) 36 2.252** -0.002** 1.683** -0.002 532 
de Giorgi and Rahman 
(2013) 
6 2.131** -0.002** 1.661** -0.001 562 
de Giorgi et al. (2015) 28 2.188** -0.002** 1.634** -0.001 540 
de Giorgi et al. (2018) 32 2.161** -0.002** 1.589** -0.001 536 
de Mel et al. (2013) 26 2.065** -0.002* 1.476** -0.001 542 
Fajnzylber et al. (2011) 36 2.092** -0.002** 1.528** -0.001 532 
Galiani et al. (2017) 48 2.228** -0.002** 1.618** -0.001 520 
Monteiros and Assuncao 
(2012) 
33 2.157** -0.002** 1.583** -0.001 535 
Piza (2016) 39 2.145** -0.002** 1.564** -0.001 529 
Rocha et al. (2014) 39 2.192** -0.002** 1.612** -0.001 529 
Rothenberg (2015) 6 2.098** -0.002* 1.562** -0.001 560 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.  
All estimates use the inverse variance as weights and standard errors are clustered at study level 
or by authors.  
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4.2 Accounting for heterogeneity across studies: 
multivariate analysis 
As discussed, the findings presented so far might be driven by other sources of 
heterogeneity. In a multivariate analysis we explore these sources of 
heterogeneity (Table 5). Importantly, once we control for the research design 
and methods of the studies, we do not consistently detect publication bias. 
This finding is consistent with the slightly skewed funnel plot (Figure 1) and 
the positive coefficient estimates of the bivariate FAT (Table 3) suggesting that 
the heterogeneity across the primary studies accounts for the found differences 
rather than any systematic publication bias.  
Consistent with the earlier discussion of the bivariate PET, the findings 
from the multivariate analysis show a small negative or weak genuine effect. 
Thus, study heterogeneity seems to be at the base of the weak overall finding 
suggesting that formalization results as depicted across studies critically depend 
on the choice of the research design and the methods of the primary studies. 
In the following section, we discuss important moderator variables in details.           
Table 5 
What drives the heterogeneity in the reported results:  
Multivariate Meta-Regression Analysis 
 
Moderator  
Variables 
1) 
CDA 
(2) 
MEM 
(3) 
FE 
Genuine effect (  -0.094* -0.095 8.037* 
 (0.052) (0.062) (2.816) 
Bias coefficient ( ) -2.929 -2.929** -2.793 
 (2.719) (1.030) (4.670) 
No. Exp. 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Data    
No. Time 0.026 0.026 -0.635 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.348) 
No. Obs. -0.005** -0.005* -0.008* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Micro enterprise -0.006 -0.006 0.911* 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.323) 
Small enterprise 0.311** 0.311*** -12.327* 
 (0.129) (0.070) (4.504) 
Latin America -0.008 -0.008 -3.424** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (1.169) 
Africa -0.309 -0.309*** 9.822* 
 (0.185) (0.070) (3.452) 
Estimation and Interventions    
OLS -0.093* -0.093*** -0.019 
 (0.052) (0.016) (0.020) 
Year FE  0.009 
(0.035) 
0.009 
(0.034) 
-0.239 
(0.221) 
Sector FE  -0.133 -0.134*** 0.072 
 (0.082) (0.023) (0.131) 
Market  0.029 0.029 -0.130 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.137) 
    
Econometric approach 0.020 0.020 0.610* 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.276) 
Enforcement 0.012 0.012 0.097* 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.054) 
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Benefit 0.045** 0.045*** 0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) 
Information 0.032 0.032 -0.016 
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.017) 
Specification    
Formal  0.179* 0.179*** -4.073* 
 (0.090) (0.036) (1.441) 
Registration 0.024 0.024*** 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.007) (0.007) 
License -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Household size 0.067*** 0.067** 0.032* 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.013) 
Age 0.076* 0.076** 0.032* 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.013) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.057** -0.057*** -0.025* 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) 
Education -0.020 -0.020 -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) 
Interaction terms  -0.007 -0.007* -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Publication    
Publication year 0.015 0.015 -0.658* 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.228) 
Published  0.012 0.012 -5.314* 
 (0.019) (0.031) (1.843) 
Study citations -0.004 -0.004 2.237** 
 (0.009 (0.011) (0.726) 
Journal impact  -0.035** -0.035** -0.869** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.257) 
Observations 568 568 568 
Studies 18 18 18 
Note: The dependent variable is the partial correlation coefficient of the formalization estimates. 
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%, 
respectively. Panel 1, CDA presents estimates from a clustered data analysis with study  
level clustered standard errors; Panel 2, MEM shows the results from a mixed-effects 
multilevel estimation employing restricted maximum likelihood; Panel 3, FE presents  
results accounting for study level fixed-effects. 
 
We start by looking at data characteristics (Table 5). The effects on 
formalization vary depending on the size of the study population: coefficients 
derived from larger study populations tend to suggest smaller impacts on 
average. The finding suggests that interventions targeting smaller populations 
are more likely to be tailored to the specific priorities of the entrepreneurs. In 
the studied small scale interventions there is likely to be closer follow up and a 
more privileged relationship between the implementer and the informal 
entrepreneur. Related, the formalization effects vary depending on the type of 
the firms targeted: the impact on small firms is about 0.311 (p-value<0.05%) 
implying a large positive meta-effect according to Doucouliagos (2011). On the 
other hand, micro-enterprises are less responsive to formalization policies. In 
this regard, it is worth recalling the heterogeneity of the informal sector and the 
existence of at least two types of informal enterprises: namely survivalist and 
growth-oriented entrepreneurs (Berner et al. 2012). It is plausible that informal 
microenterprises are mainly engaging in survivalist activities and such 
survivalist micro-enterprises have too little capital for shouldering the costs of 
registration compared to small market oriented firms; hence small firms are 
more likely to formalize compared to micro enterprises. We consider these two 
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findings important policy results since they suggest that large-scale intervention 
targeting the informal sector as a whole and one fits it all approaches might not 
be effective. 
Another source of heterogeneity is the geographic area of the 
implemented formalization policy. Policy interventions carried out in Africa 
report PCCs that are 0.309 lower compared to those derived in the Asian 
context. Note that one-third of the empirical estimates result from Africa. 
Thus, we have a decent amount of meta-effects to take the finding seriously. 
The result suggests that the optimal formalization policy for Africa has not yet 
been found. Note for example that De Giorgi et al. (2018) argue that weak 
state enforcement is likely to be a main explanation for informality suggesting 
that problems at the macro level need to be tackled first. Thus, further 
experimentation with different formalization policies seems to be warranted on 
the African continent. 
Turning to the estimation characteristics, coefficient estimates derived 
from plain vanilla OLS models are associated with a significantly negative 
effect (-0.093 according to the CDA and MEM model) compared to other 
methods. Similarly, controlling for sector specific effects in the primary analysis 
is also associated with smaller evidence for the success of formalization 
interventions.  
The multivariate analysis further shows that policies that increase the 
benefits of formalization are most successful. The associated PCC is 0.045 
larger compared to interventions that only cut registration and other costs 
(according to the CDA and MEM model). This finding is in line with 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) who show that the majority of informal firms 
do not register because they do not perceive any benefits from formalization. 
Thus, the provision of benefits such as improved access to credit, greater 
scope of marketing, access to advertisements, as well as participation in 
government contracts and programs is most likely to be most successful. These 
results support the rational exit model as compared to the exclusion model 
because the former indicates the need for immediate and actual advantages of 
registration. 
Concerning the explicit specification characteristics, if registration is 
chosen as formalization indicator the studies are most likely to report 
significant positive effects compared to other forms of formalization such as 
tax payment.  The coefficient associated with registration is 0.024 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (MEM model). Clearly, tax payments 
represent an additional cost for formalizing firms beyond the costs of the 
license or registration per se (Campos et al., 2018). Thus, expected tax 
payments might outweigh the benefits from formalization policies that cut the 
costs of formalization or increase the benefits by granting access to other 
services. Thus, policymakers have to bear in mind that it is likely to be 
counterproductive to promote an increase of tax revenues via formalization.  
Furthermore, also the reported demographic characteristics of the 
enterprise owners, such as household size, age and gender have a systematic 
effect on the formalization results. For the first two moderator variables, the 
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effect is positive, implying that primary studies controlling for household size 
and age tend to report larger formalization effects. Whereas, controlling for 
gender, i.e. whether the enterprise owner is female, results in a smaller impact 
of formalization efforts.  
Finally we turn to the publication characteristics. Articles published in 
higher impact factor journals are less likely to report a positive impact of the 
assessed formalization policies on the formalization decision of informal firms. 
This finding further explains why the upward publication bias found in the 
bivariate analysis disappears once we control for the moderator variables. 
Other moderator variables are not found to systematically influence the 
formalization outcome and thus their effects are considered to be non-
systematic.          
4.3 Further analyses and robustness checks 
In addition to the analyses conducted for the sample as a whole, in this section 
we subdivide the sample and assess the impact per policy type. Table 6 
presents the results from the FAT-PET bivariate analysis. We find that cost 
and enforcement policy interventions suffer from a positive and statistically 
significant publication bias. This finding is consistent with the one we 
established for the sample as a whole. The results are robust to the use of the 
three methods of estimation. In terms of PET, we find negative genuine 
effects for policies cutting the costs of registration and actions increasing 
enforcement, but the findings are only statistically significant for the latter.  
Table 6 
Bivariate Meta-Regression Analysis for the FAT-PET:  
Across polices 
Panel A: Cost 
Variables 
CDA  MEM  FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Bias (FAT) 1.78** 2.26 1.145* 1.91 1.68*** 16.28 
Genuine effect (PET) -0.001 -0.63 -0.001 -0.42 -0.001 -0.74 
Observations  438 438 438 
Studies 16 16 16 
Panel B: Benefit 
Variables 
CDA  MEM  FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Bias (FAT) 1.623*** 3.62 1.623 1.10 -1.81 -0.63 
Genuine effect (PET) 0.067*** 4.09 0.067** 2.37 0.14** 2.36 
Observations  104 104 104 
Studies 3 3 3 
Panel C: Enforcement 
Variables 
CDA  MEM  FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Bias (FAT)    1.540***     3.41 2.161*** 3.49 -0.033*** -13.37 
Genuine effect (PET) -0.016** -2.77 -0.027** -2.20   2.284*** 20.67 
Observations  82 82 82 
Studies 4 4 4 
Note: See the note of Table 3 for details.  
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In turn, policies increasing the benefits of formalization have a statistically 
significant positive genuine effect of 0.067 (p-value<0.001, CDA and MEM 
model). These subsample analyses clearly provide further evidence in favor of 
policies that increase the benefits of formalization. 
Next, we performed further robustness checks for the full sample. In 
Table 7, we run a bivariate meta-regression analysis for FAT-PET (i) using 
frequency weights, i.e. the inverse of the number of estimations reported per 
study and (ii) excluding effects from regressions with interaction variables. The 
findings are robust and support our main conclusions.  
Table 7 
Bivariate Meta-Regression Analysis for FAT-PET:  
Robustness checks 
 
Weighted by the inverse number of estimations per study 
Variables 
CDA MEM FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Bias (FAT)        1.157* 1.87    1.157* 1.87    -0.705 -1.51 
Genuine effect (PET) 0.004 0.40 0.004 0.40  0.039*** 4.43 
Observations  568 568 568 
Studies 18 18 18 
Excluding interaction terms 
Variables 
CDA MEM FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Bias (FAT) 2.741** 2.72 2.143** 2.73       2.546*** 30.55 
Genuine effect (PET)       -0.003** -2.24 -0.001 -0.76  -0.001 -0.74 
Observations  458 458 458 
Studies 18 18 18 
Note: See the note of Table 3 for details.  
 
 
Next, in Table 8, we report results of the multivariate meta-regression analysis 
using unweighted estimates (Columns 1-3) and weighted estimates based on 
the inverse of the number of estimations reported per study to give each study 
the same importance rather than weighting by the inverse of the variance 
(Columns 4-6). Overall, the results corroborate the main findings reported in 
Table 5. There are two exceptions: (i) combining the policy interventions with 
information campaigns is identified as having a partial effect for the 
unweighted estimates and (ii) the OLS estimation approach does no longer 
yield different outcomes.           
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   Table 8 
Source of heterogeneity: Robustness check   
Moderator  
Variables 
(1) 
CDA 
(2) 
MEM 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
CDA 
(5) 
MEM 
(6) 
FE 
Genuine effect (  0.049 
0.100 0.331 -0.080 -0.080 0.147 
 (0.166) (0.129) (0.214) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Bias coefficient ( ) -3.298 -3.126** -2.992 -2.261 -2.261 -1.088 
 (3.347) (1.251) (3.646) (1.99) (1.94) (1.72) 
No. Exp. -0.017 -0.015 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.014 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Data       
No. Time 0.037 -0.007 -0.065*** 0.051 0.051 -0.065*** 
 (0.045) (0.036) (0.004) (0.04) (0.03) (0.002) 
No. Obs. -0.018 -0.022* -0.032 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.028) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Micro 0.038 0.060  0.041* 0.041*  
 (0.049) (0.055)  (0.02) (0.02)  
Small 0.303* 0.337***  0.266* 0.266*  
 (0.176) (0.086)  (0.15) (0.15)  
Latin America -0.005 -0.010  -0.006 -0.006  
 (0.053) (0.050)  (0.02) (0.02)  
Africa -0.227 -0.283***  -0.181 -0.181  
 (0.211) (0.085)  (0.15) (0.15)  
Estimation and 
Interventions 
      
OLS -0.031 -0.018 -0.014 -0.028 -0.028 -0.015 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Year FE  0.037 0.094* 0.084* 0.016 0.016 0.058* 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Sector FE  -0.096* -0.102*** -0.057 -0.077* -0.076* -0.040 
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.034) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Market -0.008 0.018 0.021 -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Econometric approach   0.021 0.014  0.006 0.006  
 (0.023) (0.037)  (0.02) (0.02)  
Enforcement 0.034 0.054* 0.073*** 0.034 0.034 0.072*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Benefit 0.061** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.074** 0.074** 0.092** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Information 0.004 0.031* 0.044*** -0.003 -0.003 0.044*** 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.007) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Specification       
Formal  0.147 0.132** 0.059 0.098 0.098 0.018 
 (0.114) (0.041) (0.101) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) 
Registration 0.052 0.077*** 0.092 0.021 0.021 0.063 
 (0.054) (0.011) (0.072) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
License -0.003 -0.018 -0.030 0.004 0.004 -0.027 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Household size 0.013 0.031 0.037*** 0.029** 0.029*** 0.036*** 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.024) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.115* 0.114*** 0.059 0.082* 0.082** 0.051* 
 (0.049) (0.032) (0.029) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.023* -0.024* -0.025 -0.034** -0.034** -0.038** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Education -0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Interaction terms  -0.092*** -0.095*** -0.098** -0.063** -0.063** -0.071** 
 (0.026) (0.008) (0.025) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Publication      
Publication year  -0.005 -0.006  0.008 0.008  
 (0.030) (0.028)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Published  -0.017 -0.063  0.004 0.004  
 (0.038) (0.052)  (0.02) (0.02)  
Study citations 0.017 0.036  0.002 0.002  
 (0.024) (0.023)  (0.01) (0.01)  
Journal impact  -0.039* -0.074*  -0.045* -0.045**  
 (0.023) (0.035)  (0.02) (0.02)  
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 568 
Studies 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Note: See the note of Table 5 for details. Columns 1-3 show unweighted results; Columns 4-6 employ 
frequency weights, i.e. the inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights. 
 
Finally, in the Appendix we present additional analyses and robustness 
checks. According to Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), the same reported 
estimates from the same author(s) using the same data as previously published 
in an earlier version of a paper should be excluded from the analysis. In our 
case, we identified three papers published in peer-reviewed journals from the 
same authors with different reported estimates compared to the previously 
published working papers. Due to the differences across versions we include 
both the working paper and the peer-reviewed paper in our main analysis, as 
the same authors use similar data but produced different estimates. Yet, to assess 
the robustness of our results, we exclude the three working papers. This results 
in a drop in observations from 568 to 469. Results are presented in the 
Appendix. In Table 1A we present the estimates of the overall entry reforms. 
Results are almost identical to those presented in Table 2. In Table 2A we 
show the bivariate meta-regression analysis for the FAT-PET again 
corroborating our earlier findings presented in Table 3. Finally, in Table 3A we 
present the heterogeneity analysis, which is again supporting the earlier drawn 
conclusions.  
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5 Conclusions 
The empirical literature providing evidence on the formalization of informal 
firms is limited and recent. We retrieved the relevant documents using the 
PICOC protocol (Petticrew and Roberts, 2008), and analyzed the studies 
performing a meta-regression analysis based on the MAER-Net guidelines 
(Stanley et al., 2013). We identified a total of 18 primary studies that empirically 
assess the impact of policy interventions on the formalization of informal 
firms. The first study was published in 2008 suggesting that only recently 
scholars and policymakers have started assessing quantitatively which type of 
intervention works best to achieve the formalization of informal firms. 
Therefore, we consider it important to consolidate the existing evidence and 
draw some first lessons learned. If the current trend in testing formalization 
interventions continues we can expect that the number of studies per year 
increases further and the topic gains further importance. This is desirable since 
there are evident gaps: currently the literature on formalization interventions 
mainly focuses on Latin American (51%) and African countries (31%).  
What can be concluded so far? The meta-analysis reveals that currently a 
wide range of policies and interventions is put in place to promote the 
formalization of informal firms. The most popular interventions are (i) cost 
and time reducing, (ii) benefit increasing and (iii) enforcement increasing. We 
found a very modest genuine effect across all three types of interventions 
suggesting that in practical terms the interventions implemented so far had 
hardly any impact on firm formalization. At a first glance, this finding seems to 
suggest that informal firms are insensitive to formalization policies, which is 
consistent with theoretical considerations such as the dual economy model (La 
Porta and Shleifer 2008; 2014). However, when accounting for the different 
types of formalization policies, the results suggest a more nuanced picture: 
interventions increasing the benefits of formalization tend to have positive 
effects compared to the other two types of interventions. Thus, restricting the 
sample according to the type of policy implemented, the rational exit model 
(Maloney 2004) seems to best explain the decision of formalizing a business. 
The findings are robust to various tests, and different regression methods using 
alternative weights. 
Based on these meta-results we can draw the following initial conclusions 
for policy making. First, the limited impact of policies seeking formalization 
strongly challenges the formalization paradigm and underlines the need for 
elaborating new policies that might even be different from systematic 
formalization. The current evidence suggests that if we subscribe to the 
principle of promoting informal firms’ registration, policies increasing benefits 
should be the intervention of choice. Policies based uniquely on increasing 
enforcement are particularly discouraged, since they even decrease 
formalization rates. Second, concerning the different types of formality 
indicators, the meta-analysis indicates that firm registration is likely not the 
most suitable tool for promoting tax compliance and increasing tax revenues.  
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Third and most importantly for governments that aim at implementing 
formalization policies at large scale, the type of the target population plays a 
key role in determining the success of the interventions: small enterprises are 
more likely to respond positively to external interventions compared to micro 
enterprises. Therefore, tailoring policies to the priorities of the target groups is 
key for interventions to be effective. Policymakers who are in need of quick 
fixes should focus on interventions that increase the benefits of formalization 
and if possible try to design new policies that go beyond the formalization of 
informal entrepreneurs. A first step could be to strengthen the existing links 
between the formal and informal economy (Guha-Kasnobis et al., 2007). In 
this perspective, involving informal actors in the policymaking process could 
be a feasible choice for designing tailored policies and for elaborating 
innovative strategies addressed to informal entrepreneurs. In similar vein, new 
policy reforms and additional field experiments testing innovative interventions 
might help bring further light to the shadows of informality. 
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Appendix 2: Additional robustness checks excluding working 
papers 
Table 1A 
Estimates of the overall entry reforms – a robustness checks 
Method Effect size S.E 95% confidence interval 
Simple average effecta 0.035 0.004 0.027 0.043 
Weighted average effectb 0.002 0.001 0.0003 0.004 
Weighted average effectc  0.024 0.004 0.017 0.031 
 Note: See the note of Table 2 for details.    
 
 
 
Table 2A 
Bivariate Meta-Regression Analysis for the FAT-PET – a robustness checks 
All studies 
 
Variables 
CDA MEM FE 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient t-value 
Bias (FAT)    1.837*** 2.59     1.376** 2.39      1.714*** 18.62 
Genuine effect (PET)      -0.002* -1.80      -0.001 -0.60      -0.001  -0.52 
Observations  469 469 469 
Studies 15 15 15 
Note:  ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. CDA - clustered data analysis with study 
level clustered standard errors; MEM - mixed-effects multilevel estimates derived from restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation; FE - fixed-effects estimation at the study level. The test for between-
study heterogeneity (Q-test) is 12846.96*** on 468 degrees of freedom with a p-value of less than 
0.000 and the I2 statistic (variation in reported estimates attributable to heterogeneity) is 96.4%. All 
estimates use the inverse variance as weights and standard errors are clustered at study level. 
Reported t-values are from cluster-robust standard errors.  
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Table 3A 
What drives the heterogeneity in the reported results:  
Multivariate Meta-Regression Analysis – a robustness checks 
Moderator  
Variables 
(1) 
CDA 
(2) 
MEM 
(3) 
FE 
Genuine effect (  -0.215   -3.019***   -3.184*** 
 (0.247) (0.690) (0.255) 
Bias coefficient ( ) -2.580  14.933 -25.079*** 
 (2.428) (12.949) (1.871) 
No. Exp. 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Data    
No. Time -0.029 -0.038 -0.027 
 (0.020) (0.067) (0.031) 
No. Obs.   -0.004** -0.006* -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Micro enterprise -0.004    0.176**    0.185*** 
 (0.040) (0.077) (0.053) 
Small enterprise    0.504***     
9.224*** 
9.535*** 
 (0.156) (1.068) (0.714) 
Latin America 0.038 1.597*** 1.661*** 
 (0.046) (0.234) (0.136) 
Africa -0.349*   -4.092*** -4.261*** 
 (0.163) (0.739) (0.508) 
Estimation and 
Interventions 
   
OLS -0.015   -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.002) 
Year FE  -0.001 
(0.043) 
0.069 
(0.052) 
0.072* 
(0.040) 
Sector FE  -0.072*      -0.056 -0.058 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.037) 
Market  0.004 0.035 0.041 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.035) 
Econometric approach -0.069** 0.098    0.101*** 
 (0.031) (0.081) (0.277) 
Enforcement     0.076*** 0.032    0.030*** 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.004) 
Benefit     0.057***    0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) 
Information    0.034***     -
0.034** 
-0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.001) 
Specification    
Formal       0.209***    2.202*** 2.278*** 
 (0.064) (0.328) (0.216) 
Registration 0.033   0.008* 0.008 
 (0.038) (0.004) (0.005) 
License -0.007 0.002 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.002) 
Household size      0.046**   0.029   0.029*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.001) 
Age 0.075* 0.012 0.001 
 (0.039) (0.020) (0.010) 
    
Gender (Female=1) -0.069**    -0.017* -0.016 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.009) 
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Education -0.008 0.007 0.007** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.002) 
Interaction terms  -0.008 -0.009*** -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.014) 
Publication    
Publication year 0.057 -0.335 -0.331*** 
 (0.098) (0.244) (0.095) 
Published  0.012    
2.663*** 
2.785*** 
 (0.042) (0.423) (0.309) 
Study citations 0.029 -0.308* -0.342** 
 (0.031) (0.175) (0.133) 
Journal impact    -0.164*** -2.894*** -2.949*** 
 (0.046) (0.117) (0.048) 
Observations 469 469 469 
Studies 15 15 15 
Note: See the note of Table 5 for details.  
 
 
 
